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In this paper we provide the first analysis of the relationship of growth to election 
outcomes in India.  Using a comprehensive data set consisting of all candidates 
contesting the election, we also provide the first systematic quantitative analysis of the 
2009 Lok Sabha elections. Our key result is that superior growth performance at the level 
of the state gives a definite advantage to the candidates of the state incumbent party in the 
constituencies of that state.  Conversely, poor growth performance of a state is associated 
with poor electoral performance by the candidates of the state incumbent party in the 
constituencies of that state.  We offer two additional results: personal characteristics such 
as education and wealth have at most a small impact on election outcomes; and, at least 
in the 2009 election, incumbency at all levels contributed positively to election prospects 
of a candidate. 
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1. Introduction 
Indian election results often spring surprises. It was particularly the case when the 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which led the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government, unexpectedly lost the 2004 Lok Sabha election. Many critics of economic 
reforms celebrated the outcome as a vote against the reforms.1  Since party of NDA ally 
and Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu, who had been strongly 
identified with economic reforms, also suffered a bitter defeat in the state elections held 
simultaneously, this view gained additional currency. An alternative explanation offered 
for this outcome was the anti-incumbency factor.2 This view assumed without offering 
the underlying reason that the Indian voters preferred change to status quo.   
But the outcome of the 2009 national elections seemingly went against this 
alternative hypothesis: it returned the Congress, the main ruling party, to power with 
significantly larger number of seats in the Lower House of the Parliament.  This time 
around, the state elections held in 2009 also returned the incumbent state governments in 
many states such as Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Haryana.  These outcomes 
also seemed to contradict the incumbency disadvantage hypothesis. 
Election outcomes in India, thus, seem not to show a clear pattern in terms of 
incumbency disadvantage.  At the same time, even if the UPA government has let the 
reform process stall, neither it nor other governments have disavowed the reforms let 
                                                 
1 “Lok Sabha,” translated as the “House of People,” is the lower house of the Indian Parliament.  For 
purposes of elections to Lok Sabha, the country is divided into 543 constituencies, principally on the basis 
of population, with each constituency electing one member.  Elections to the upper house, called Rajya 
Sabha, are indirect with the vast majority of its members elected by the state legislative assemblies. 
2 The political-economy literature refers to this view as the incumbency disadvantage. 
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alone reverse them.  Seen this way, the election outcomes in India remain something of a 
puzzle.   
In this paper, we take the first stab at a systematic quantitative analysis of the 
determinants of election outcomes in India using the data for 2009 elections. Our analysis 
focuses on the personal characteristics of the candidates such as their wealth and 
education levels as well as the role incumbency may play at the level of the candidate as 
well as parties in power at national and state levels.  Most importantly, we ask whether 
growth at the state level has a perceptible impact on victory prospects of the candidates 
contesting on the ticket of the party in power in the state. We ask whether the candidates 
of the main ruling party enjoy an advantage in states experiencing superior growth 
outcomes and suffer a disadvantage in states with poor growth outcomes.  
Given the relative ease of gathering the candidate-specific data for more recent 
elections, our analysis in the paper focuses on the latest 2009 parliamentary election.    
The 2009 election is of interest in its own right as well since, like the 2004 election, it too 
carried a large element of surprise.  Given the general disarray in both the Congress-led 
UPA, which ruled during 2004-09, and the BJP, the main opposition party, predictions of 
the election results varied widely from marginal victories for the UPA and NDA to the 
emergence of a “Third Front” consisting of a group of the left-of-center parties.  Yet, 
defying all forecasts, the Congress greatly increased its tally from 145 to 206 seats and 
comfortably formed government with a group of smaller parties.  
To carry out our analysis, we assembled a large new data set covering all 8,071 
candidates that contested the 2009 election.  The data set includes several relevant 
characteristics of all candidates, their party affiliation, their incumbency status as 
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candidates, the incumbency status of their parties at the center and in the state in which 
their constituencies are located and the relative growth rates of various states.  The 
candidate specific information includes gender, level of education, wealth and criminal 
record and is compiled from the affidavits that the Election Commission requires each 
candidate to file with his or her nomination.  The determination of incumbency status at 
the level of the candidate requires matching the names of the outgoing Members of 
Parliament (MPs) with those of the candidates in the 2009 election.  The determination of 
the incumbency status of the party of affiliation at the center and at the level of the state 
requires the examination of the election records provided by the Election Commission.  
Finally the data on growth rates are collected from the Central Statistical Organization 
(CSO). 
Our main result may be summarized as follows.  First, the 2009 Parliamentary 
election show very strongly that controlling for other relevant determinants of elections, 
on average, candidates of the incumbent party in a state have a better chance of scoring a 
victory if that state exhibits higher growth than the median state.  Symmetrically, on 
average, the candidates of the incumbent party in a state growing slower than the median 
state are punished.  The larger the deviation from the median growth rate, the larger is 
this effect in either direction.  Second, on average, incumbency at all levels was helpful in 
winning the 2009 election.  That is to say, on average, an incumbent candidate and the 
candidates of the ruling parties at the center and states had better chances of victory than 
other candidates.  This incumbency effect could be due to a variety of reasons such as the 
incumbent candidates and parties having more resources to spend on election campaigns, 
having better name recognition or even being more charismatic.  Our results here do not 
 4
separate the pure incumbency effect on which a great deal of the political science 
literature focuses.  Finally, we also find that on average, more educated and wealthier 
candidates have a better chance of victory.  These advantages turn out to be far more 
important in the states exhibiting low growth and indeed have a tendency to become 
statistically insignificant in states exhibiting high growth rates. 
The idea pursued here is similar to the one proposed in an op-ed article in Wall 
Street Journal by Bhagwati and Panagariya (2004). Commenting on the trend that shows 
that anti incumbency seems to have become more dominant in Indian elections since 
1991, they propose that in more recent years voters have started taking into account the 
economic performance to decide whether to vote in favor of or against the incumbents. 
Whereas in earlier years during the 1950s through the mid 1980s when the overall 
economic performance in general was not impressive, people saw no perceptible change 
in their lives, which led them to turn extremely pessimistic in so far as their economic 
fortunes were concerned. Resigned that a significant change was impossible their, voting 
decision was perhaps based on other factors, which often resulted in the incumbent 
Congress Party being voted back to power. With the high growth of the 1980s and 
thereafter, when incomes began to grow at higher rates on a sustained basis and poverty 
began to decline, people’s aspirations were fundamentally altered: having experienced 
change for the better, they wanted more of it and sooner than later. And if a current 
government would not deliver it, they would look for another one. Thus Bhagwati and 
Panagariya (2004) propose that in more recent years economic performance has become 
an important determinant of the way voters behave, and it perhaps explains why anti 
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incumbency has become a more prominent feature of election outcomes.3  We offer a 
more detailed discussion of the relevant literature in Section 3.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we offer a quick preview of our 
main result.  In Section 3, we discuss the literature on elections in general and that on 
elections in India in particular.  In Sections 4 and 5, we describe some salient features of 
the 2009 election and the relevant characteristics of the candidates, respectively.  In 
Section 6, we present our regression results and in Section 7, we conclude the paper. 
2.  The Key Result: A Quick Preview 
We find it useful to give a preview of our main result at the outset.  This requires 
the definitions of the incumbent party at the state level and high- and low-growth states.  
We define as incumbent party the main ruling party (or two main parties if they shared 
power) in power in the state in 2007 and the preceding two or three years. This means 
that if a state legislative assembly election is held in 2008 or 2009 and the government 
changes hands, the outgoing party is still considered the incumbent in that state for 
purposes of the 2009 national elections, which were held in April and May of that year.  
It is a reasonable assumption that voters who punish a party in the state elections in 2008 
or 2009 for its poor performance will also punish it in the national election in April-May 
2009.    
To group the states on the basis of growth performance, we first identify 21 major 
states, thus, excluding the union territories and eight northeastern states (including Assam 
and Sikkim), where special circumstances apply due to the history of separatist 
                                                 
3 Linden (2004) suggests that the proliferation of parties in recent years may have further contributed to 
voters voting for their favorite parties and against the incumbents.   
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movements and heavy presence of the central government on a continuous basis.4 We 
then calculate the average growth rates in these states between 2004-05 and 2008-09 and 
rank them in declining order of the growth rates. 5   This allows us to divide the states into 
three groups of equal number of states exhibiting high, medium and low growth rates. 
 Figure 1: The Proportion of the Candidates of the Incumbent Party in the State 




Armed with this classification of the states and the definition of the incumbent 
party, we can ask the following key question: what proportion of the candidates fielded 
by the state incumbent party in the Lok Sabha constituencies located in that state won the 
national election?  The outcome is depicted in Figure 1.  Remarkably, incumbent parties 
                                                 
4 We include Delhi s a state in our analysis. 
5 Years 2004-05 and 2007-08 and other similarly expressed periods refer to India’s financial year, which 
begins on April 1 and ends on March 31.  Therefore, 2004-05 stands for the period from April 1 2004 to 
March 31, 2005. 
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in the high-growth states won 85 percent of the seats they contested.  In contrast, those in 
medium and low growth states could win only approximately 50 and 30 percent of the 
seats contested, respectively.  This strong relationship between growth performance and 
election outcomes handsomely survives every model modification we consider in our 
regression analysis in Section 6. 
3. The Relevant Literature 
A large body of the literature on electoral competition developed in the context of the 
western democracies employs the principal-agent framework and focuses on how the 
desire to win elections conditions the behavior of politicians.  This literature asks how 
political incumbents might try to maximize their chances of reelection through tax and 
expenditure policies favorable to their constituencies, cast legislative votes that conform 
to the ideological make-up of their constituencies and exchange political favors for 
campaign contributions.6  Given that our objective is to study the determinants of 
electoral outcomes rather than incumbent behavior to maximize the chances of electoral 
victory, this literature is at best indirectly relevant to our work.  
A different strand of the literature examines whether incumbency by itself is an asset 
or liability in elections.  This literature is closer to our paper in that it focuses on the 
determinants of election outcomes but it is somewhat narrowly focused on the 
identification of the incumbency advantage.  The literature stems from the fact that higher 
unconditional probability of victory of an incumbent over non-incumbents may be the 
                                                 
6 For example, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Alesina and Rosenthal [1989] analyze the use of fiscal and 
monetary policy actions and Besley and Case (1995) of tax-expenditure choices by incumbents to gain 
electoral support.  Levitt and Poterba (1994) study the effect of Congressional Representation on state 
economic growth.  Levitt (1994), Baron (1989) and Snyder (1990) examine the response of politicians to 
campaign contributions.  Lee (2001) provides additional references. 
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result of selection bias and therefore need not represent incumbency advantage per se. 
Conversely, a lower unconditional probability of victory of the incumbent may not 
represent incumbency disadvantage.  Incumbents may win more frequently simply 
because they happen to be better candidates or have more resources to spend on 
campaigns.  Alternatively, if incumbent lose more frequently than non-incumbents, this 
may be simply because they fail to keep a number of inconsistent promises made in the 
prior election or because they prove themselves to be inept during their term.  Therefore, 
the observed frequencies of losses and wins by incumbents are by themselves insufficient 
to isolate the effect of incumbency.  The most compelling approach to identifying the 
impact of incumbency is regression discontinuity, which tries to identify incumbents and 
non-incumbents who are otherwise identical in all respects and compares their 
probabilities of victory in election.7  
In the Indian context, the literature on the incumbency advantage or disadvantage is 
relatively new.  In an as yet unpublished paper, Linden (2004) uses the regression 
discontinuity approach and finds that prior to 1991, incumbents had enjoyed an 
advantage over non-incumbents.  But beginning in 1991, this relationship reversed with 
incumbents suffering a disadvantage.  For the elections from 1991 to 1999, he estimates 
that on average incumbents were 14 percentage points less likely to be elected than 
comparable non-incumbents.8  He reaches this conclusion by comparing the probabilities 
of victory of candidates in an election that had barely won (incumbents) to those of the 
                                                 
7 An excellent example of this analysis is Lee (2001).  A vast body of political science literature is devoted 
to the analysis of the incumbency effect in election outcomes.  For example, see Erikson 1971, Collie 1981, 
Garand and Gross 1984, Jacobson 1987, Payne 1980, Alford and Hibbing 1981, and Gelman and King 
1990 and Lee 2001.   
8 Uppal (2005) also finds that incumbency has hurt the candidates in recent Indian elections.  
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candidates who barely lost (non-incumbents) the prior election.  The underlying 
assumption is that the candidates that just win and those that just lose an election are 
identical in all respect and any advantage or disadvantage to a victorious candidate 
(incumbent) in the following election must result from incumbency.  
While Linden (2004) studies incumbency disadvantage at the level of the candidate, a 
number of descriptive analytic studies following the 2004 election have focused on the 
disadvantage arising from association with an incumbent party.  Panagariya (2004), and 
Yadav (2004) note that on average the state ruling parties performed poorly in the 2004 
national elections in the constituencies located in their own states but with one major 
exception: candidates of parties that had defeated the party in power in a state election 
held just prior to the national election did well in the latter as well.9  Yadav characterizes 
the one to two-year period between the state and national elections when the state ruling 
party has just come in power as the “honeymoon” period during which the latter’s 
candidates (i.e., candidates of the recently empowered incumbent party in the state) enjoy 
a positive advantage.  As we will explain later, our definition of the incumbent party in a 
state takes into account this difference between the “entrenched” and “recent” incumbent.   
Ravishankar (2009) carries out a quantitative analysis of the prospects of victory for 
the incumbent candidates of the main party in power relative to the incumbent candidates 
of the main opposition party using the national and state election data from 1977 to 2005.  
                                                 
9 This point is also made by Panagariya (2004) when he states, “The results [of 2004 Parliamentary 
elections] broadly reflect an anti-incumbency vote principally at the state level.  Even where anti-
incumbency explanation does not apply, the state-level politics rather than a rural-urban split remains the 
decisive factor.  Until recently, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh had Congress governments, 
which had pursued policies centered on rural development, primary education and health.  Nevertheless, in 
the state-level elections in December 2003, the Congress governments in all three states lost by landslides 
to the BJP and its allies.  In the current parliamentary elections, all three states voted overwhelmingly for 
the BJP and its allies.  In the December 2003 state elections, the Congress had managed to retain power in 
Delhi and it swept there in the parliamentary elections as well.” 
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Because her analysis is strictly restricted to incumbent candidates, it does not compare 
incumbent and non-incumbent candidates.  She finds that setting aside the parties in their 
honeymoon period, incumbent candidates of the main party in power in both national and 
state elections face higher probability of loss in their reelection bids than the incumbent 
candidates of the main opposition party.  Ravishankar (2009) also finds a cross effect 
flowing from party incumbency at the national level to state elections and vice versa.  
Once again, setting aside the parties in their honeymoon period, incumbent candidates of 
the main party in power at the center face a higher probability of defeat than the 
incumbent candidates of the main opposition party at the center.  Symmetrically, 
incumbent candidates of a party in power in a state face a higher probability of defeat in 
the national election than the incumbent candidates of the main opposition party within 
that state.   
A key shortcoming of Ravishankar (2009) is that it excludes non-incumbent 
candidates.  If the incumbency effect is associated with the party in power, there is no 
reason why it would not apply to non-incumbent candidates contesting the election on the 
incumbent party’s ticket.  Our data set, though confined to the 2009 national elections, 
includes all candidates and therefore allows for more complete test of the incumbency 
effect at the level of the party. 
4. Salient Features of the 2009 Election  
In one fundamental sense, the 2009 national election was different from the 2004 
election: it returned the main ruling party, the Congress, to power and with a larger 
victory margin and with a larger number of seats.  The immediate dominant reaction to 
the results in the press was that incumbency had helped rather than hurt in this election, 
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though some observers did question this conclusion.10  How far this is true is part of our 
investigation. 
India has more than one thousand registered political parties.  These are divided into 
unrecognized, state and national parties.  Any registered party that lacks the status of state 
or national party is an unrecognized party.  The Election Commission (EC) confers the 
status of state party on any party that meets certain thresholds in terms of votes received 
and seats won in an election.  A state party acquires monopoly on the use of its party 
symbol in the state.  A party qualifying as state party in four states gets the national status 
and then has the monopoly over the use of its election symbol over the entire country.  It 
is not unusual for parties to lose the national status if they lose the qualifications for it. 
To provide some background, Table 1 reports the broad results of the elections held 
in 1999, 2004 and 2009.  The first point to note is that the national parties numbering six 
or more in each of these elections have won a little more than two-thirds of the seats.  
The party winning the largest number of seats has fallen well short of the majority so that 
each government has been based on a multi-party coalition.  Because the party with the 
second most votes ends up in the opposition, state parties, which together account for 
approximately 30 percent of the seats acquire great importance. 
Led by the BJP, the NDA had ruled from 1999 to 2004.  Counting on its popularity at 
the time, it called for early elections.  But, as already discussed, the BJP suffered major 
                                                 
10 For instance, in an op-ed, Panagariya (2009) argued that the outcome in the 2009 election was consistent 
with the original Bhagwati and Panagariya (2004) hypothesis that the electorate rewarded the ruling party 
in a performing state while punishing that in a non-performing state.  He went on to point out that the 
national incumbent, the Congress party, could win only nine out of 72 seats in the states of Bihar, Orissa 
and Chhattisgarh, which had performing non-Congress governments.  On the other hand, Delhi and Andhra 
Pradesh had performing Congress chief ministers and the party respectively bagged seven out of seven and 
33 out of 42 seats in those two states.  In Rajasthan, the Congress had trounced out an unpopular BJP chief 
minister less than six months prior to the national elections.  In the national election, it went on to win 20 
out of 25 seats in that state. 
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losses shrinking from 182 to 138 seats.  The Congress improved its tally from 114 to 145 
seats, well short of the 272 seats necessary to from a government.  But remarkably, it was 
successful in cobbling together a coalition that came to be known as the UPA.  The UPA 
government successfully served its entire term until 2009.  At one level, it could be 
argued that neither the decline in the seats held by the NDA from 182 to 138 nor the rise 
in the seats held by the Congress from 114 to 145 represented a major shift away from 
the incumbent towards the opposition.  Yet, given the expectations of a clear mandate in 
favor of a very popular Prime Minister, the media uniformly described the outcome as a 
clear vote against the incumbents. 
Table 1: Broad Results of the National Elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009 
Party  1999 2004 2009
National Parties  369 364 376
 Indian National Congress 114 145 206
 Bharatiya Janata Party 182 138 116
 Bahujan Samaj Party 14 19 21
 Nationalist Congress Party  9 9
 Communist Party of India 4 10 4
 Communist Party of India (Marxist) 33 43 16
 Rashtriya Janata Dal   4
 JD(S) 1   
 JD(U) 21   
State Parties (E.g., DMK, TDP, SP, TC) 158 159 146
Other (unrecognized) Parties  10 15 12
Independent candidates  6 5 9
TOTAL  543 543 543
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In the 2009 election, which is the subject of this paper, 372 parties in all fielded one 
or more candidates. Of the winning candidates, 534 had a party affiliation so that 
independents represented only nine constituencies.  Beating even the most optimistic 
predictions, the Congress increased its tally from 145 to an impressive 206 seats.  The 
Marxist Communist Party suffered the worst losses shrinking from 43 to 16 seats.  The 
BJP also declined from 138 to 116 seats.  Between 1999 and 2009, the Congress and the 
BJP had more or less exchanged their positions. 
A total of 8,071 candidates contested the 2009 election.  Of these, as many as 3,825 
were independent.  Another 2,449 came from 41 national or regional parties.  These 
candidates accounted for more than 80 percent of the top four candidates ranked by the 
number of votes received.  Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of seats won by 
these parties.  Four of these 41 parties won no seats.  As many as 13 parties won only one 
seat each.  At the other extreme, there were ten parties that won 10 or more seats each.  
Together, these latter parties won 472 or 87 percent of the seats. 
Table 2: Distribution of parties according to the number of seats won 






0 4 0 
1 13 13 
2 to 9 14 71 
10 or more 10 543 
 
The average number of candidates per constituency was 15 with the maximum and 
minimum number of candidates in any constituency being 43 and 3, respectively.  
Remarkably, as the latter figure indicates, there was not a single constituency with direct 
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election between two candidates.  Countrywide, 59.4 percent of the voters turned up to 
vote.  The maximum and minimum turnout rates were 90.3 and 25.6 percent, 
respectively.  Constituencies near the higher limit were in West Bengal followed by 
northeastern and southern states.  Those near the lower end were in the states of Jammu 
& Kashmir, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. 


















0 10 20 30 40
Candidates ranked, 1=winner
 
 Top 4 candidates in most constituencies accounted for the bulk of the votes polled 
in each constituency.  This can be gleaned to some degree from Figure 2, which plots for 
each constituency the percent of votes received by each candidate with the candidates 
ranked by the proportion of votes received.  Thus, for example, the first “bar” in Figure 2 
is formed by the proportion of the votes received by the top candidate in each of the 543 
constituencies.  Although as many as 372 parties fielded as many as 8,071 candidates 
nationwide, top 4 candidates for each constituency taken together (i.e., 2,172 candidates) 
 15
accounted for 90 percent of the total votes polled.  This can be gleaned from the fact that 
the density of votes in Figure 2 is heavily concentrated in the first four candidates.  Given 
this distribution, in our regression model in Section 6, we will often limit the sample to 
top four candidates. 
5. Characteristics of the Candidates    
We next turn to a brief description of the characteristics of the candidates.  For each 
candidate, we are able to collect data on wealth, education, criminal cases, gender, and 
incumbency status.  Although we took this information from the website 
http://myneta.info, we randomly checked it against the original affidavits filed by the 
candidates and available on the website of the Election Commission and found it to be 
accurate.  In the following, we provide the broad picture of the candidates of the 41 main 
parties along these dimensions.11 

















1 0-0.5 392 13 0.03 
2 0.5-5 809 132 0.16 
3 5-10 348 85 0.24 
4 10-50 627 191 0.30 
5 50-higher 273 112 0.41 
Total  2449 533 0.22 
 
                                                 
11 The criterion we have used to identify a main party is that it should have one or more member in the 
2009 Lok Sabha.  
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Table 3 provides the distribution of the candidates of the main 41 parties by wealth.  
It defines five different wealth categories to summarize the raw data.  Two features of the 
table stand out.  First, candidates from all wealth categories are able to participate in 
elections on the tickets of the main parties.  Almost half of the candidates of the main 
parties have the wealth of 5 million rupees or less.  Second, nevertheless, the 
unconditional probability of victory rapidly rises with wealth.  This comes out most 
dramatically if we compare the probability of victory of a candidate in the highest wealth 
category to that of the lowest wealth category:  the former is more than 13 times the 
latter.  We caution, of course, that no causal relationship between wealth and election 
outcome can be drawn from these data.  Wealth can very well be positively correlated 
with other attributes that define a good candidate in the eyes of the electorate. 















0 No Formal Education 8 0 0 
1 Up to Class V 108 13 0.12 
2 Middle or High School 621 100 0.16 
3 Undergraduate degree 650 150 0.23 
4 Post graduate or higher 
or technical degree 
860 247 0.29 
     
  
Next, we consider the level of education across contesting and winning candidates.  
As in the case of wealth, we divide education levels into five categories beginning with 
complete illiteracy and ending with post-graduate or higher or a technical degree.  The 
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outcome is reported in Table 4.  Three features of the table are noteworthy.  First, 
contrary to the common impression most candidates contesting elections have some 
formal education.  Indeed, the vast majority of those contesting have at least gone 
through the middle school.  Second and more importantly, more than half of the Members 
of Parliament in the 2009 Lok Sabha boast of an undergraduate or higher degree.  At the 
other extreme, while 8 candidates with no formal education did contest elections 
reflecting the openness of India’s democracy, none actually won.  Finally, the 
unconditional probability of election consistently rises with the education level.  As in the 
case of wealth, this fact need not reflect causation if education is correlated with other 
factors that make a candidate attractive to the electorate. 















0 0 1,850 373 0.20 
1 1 305 75 0.25 
2 2-4 214 60 0.28 
3 5-9 53 14 0.26 
4 10 27 11 0.41 
 
The third characteristic we consider is the number of criminal cases pending against 
the contesting and winning candidates.  This is done in Table 5.  In constructing the table, 
we identify five categories based on the number of pending cases.  Two features of the 
table stand out.  First, a very large number of candidates have criminal cases pending 
against them.  Even if we exclude candidates with just one case since the prospects of 
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frivolous cases are high against those in politics, as many as 85 members of the current 
Lok Sabha have two or more criminal cases pending against them.  Second, somewhat 
disconcertingly, the within group unconditional probability of victory is higher, the larger 
the number of criminal cases against the candidate.    
Table 6: Distribution of Candidates with Criminal Records by State 
State Percent of candidates 
with one or more 
criminal cases 
 State Percent of 
candidates with one 
or more criminal 
cases 
Jharkhand 43  Andhra Pradesh 18 
Bihar 42  Tamil Nadu 15 
Kerala 41  Goa 14 
Maharashtra 39  Madhya Pradesh 14 
Uttar Pradesh 35  West Bengal 13 
Orissa 32  Assam 11 
Gujarat 28  Punjab 9 
Delhi 24  Rajasthan 8 
Karnataka 23  Chhattisgarh 6 
Uttarakhand 22  Himachal Pradesh 6 
Haryana 19    
 
 We found no specific pattern of candidates with criminal records across parties 
but did find a pattern across states broadly conforming to our intuitive expectation.  Table 
6 reports percent of the total candidates with one or more criminal records.  Among the 
states, Jharkhand and Bihar with 43 and 42 percent of the candidates with criminal cases 
top the list.  Somewhat surprisingly, Kerala follows right behind with 41 percent of the 
candidates having criminal cases registered against them.  Predictably, the states in the 
south (except Kerala) have somewhat lower rates but these are by no means low.  Among 
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the larger states, Punjab and Rajasthan show the lowest rates at 9 and 8 percent, 
respectively.   
Table 7: Gender Composition of Contesting and Winning Candidates  
(Top Four Candidates) 
 

















Women 194 58 7.9 10.9 0.30 
Men 2255 475 92.1 89.1 0.21 
 
 In Table 7, we show the gender composition of the contesting and winning 
candidates for the candidates of the main 41 parties.  In the 2009 election, women have a 
relatively small share in both contesting and winning candidates.   Within group 
unconditional probability of winning the election was slightly higher for women than 
men, however.  
Table 8: Average of the Characteristics Across Various Candidates 









Age 46 51 53 
Wealth (Category)/average wealth 2.1 2.8 3.5 
Criminal Record (probability) 0.14 0.24 0.30 
Membership in a main party (probability) 0.30 1.00 0.98 
Male (probability) 0.93 0.92 0.89 
Education (category) 2.6 2.9 3.24 
Incumbent (probability) 0.048 .15 .34 
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Next, in Table 8, we provide the average of each characteristic across all 
candidates, candidates from the 41 main parties and the winning candidates.  If we could 
construct a winning candidate with these average characteristics, he would be a wealthy 
male (with mean assets worth 60 million rupees and median assets worth 12 million 
rupees) in his mid 50s with at least an undergraduate degree.  He would come from one 
of the main political parties. There is a 30 percent chance that he would have at least one 
criminal case against him and a 15 percent chance that he will have 2 or more criminal 
cases pending against him.  There is also one-third probability that he had served as an 
MP in the previous parliament. 
Table 9: Incumbents Among all Contestants, Those Among the Main Parties and 
Among Winners 
 
 All Candidates Main Parties Elected 2009 Within group 
probability of 
winning 
Incumbents 387  373  184  0.48 
Non incumbents 7684 2076 357 0.05 
Total 8071 2449 543 0.07 
 
Finally, we compare the incumbents and non-incumbents among all contesting 
candidates, those in the main parties and the winning candidates.  Table 9 shows that 
non-incumbent candidates far outnumber incumbent ones.  With 15 candidates per 
constituency contesting election on average, it should be no surprise that even if half of 
the incumbents were voted out, the unconditional probability of their victory relative to 
non-incumbents would be very high.  Therefore, losses to a large number of incumbents 
are quite consistent with the incumbents having a strong showing in a statistical sense.  In 
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a similar vein, even as the main parties such as the Congress and the BJP might 
experience a decline in their tally of seats, the statistical probability of their candidates 
winning would still remain very high relative to the rest of the main parties taken 
together.  This feature will be observed in our regression analysis below.  
Table 10: Correlations between Various Candidates Characteristics 
 Age Gender Education Wealth Criminal 
cases 
      
Gender -0.12*** 1    
Education 0.12*** 0.01 1   
Wealth 0.22*** 0.02 0.13*** 1  
Criminal cases -0.03 -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.08*** 1 
Incumbent 0.19*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.00 
 
As we mentioned earlier, many of these characteristics are likely to be correlated with 
each other. Looking at the bivariate correlations in Table 10 we see that though many of 
these characteristics are correlated statistically significantly with each other, the 
coefficients are numerically small. The table shows wealthier candidates are also more 
educated and older but have more criminal cases against them; while educated candidates 
and women candidates have fewer criminal cases registered against them.  
6. Regression Model and the Results 
We now turn to a quantitative analysis of the election results using candidate level 
data.  For this purpose, we postulate the following regression equation: 
 (1)  ijssssjjiiijs EconPerfIncumBAY   *  
Here Yijs refers to the election outcome of candidate i, belonging to party j, contesting 
from state s.  It is a binary variable taking the value of 1 in case of victory and 0 in case 
 22
of defeat.12  Ai is a vector of candidate-specific variables such as wealth, education, 
gender, number of criminal cases pending and candidate level incumbency.  Bj, likewise, 
is a vector representing party-specific variables.  For example, it may represent 
membership in the main ruling or opposition party at the national level, main ruling 
coalition at the national level or the main ruling party at the state level.  Alternatively, we 
include party specific or coalition specific dummies. Variable Incums*EconPerf  is our 
key variable intended to capture the interaction between incumbency at the level of the 
state and economic performance as measured by growth.13 Finally, εijs is an error term 
with usual properties. 
 The Incumbency at the state level and economic performance variables require 
further elaboration. Variable Incums takes a value of 1 if the candidate in question 
belongs to the incumbent party in the state in which his or her constituency is located and 
0 otherwise.  The incumbent party, in turn, is defined as the main ruling party (or two 
main ruling parties which shared power) in 2007 and the preceding two or three years.  If 
there was an election for the state legislative assembly in 2008 or 2009 and the party 
ruling until 2007 lost this election, it was still considered the incumbent party for 
purposes of the national elections held in April-May 2009.  The underlying logic is that 
an electorate would treat the party that was in government for several years prior to 2009 
responsible for the policies and performance of the state rather than the party that took 
over as the government in the year just before the general election.  
                                                 
12 In our future work, we intend to extend this work by using the proportions of votes received or victory 
margin for the winner and 0 for other candidates.   
13 Ideally perhaps one should include the performance at constituency level in the regressions, however 
since data is not available at such a disaggregated level we use the state level growth data.   
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By definition, the union territories do not have territory-level governments and 
therefore must be excluded from regressions in which we employ the variable 
representing the state-level incumbency.  In addition, we exclude Jammu and Kashmir, 
the eight northeastern states (including Assam and Sikkim) most of which have a small 
number of constituencies and have a very strong presence of the central government. In 
addition, since determining the incumbent state government was not possible for 
Karnataka due to frequent changes in the government, it had to be dropped. These 
exclusions limit the sample to 19 large states. 
 Because the economic performance variable, EconPerf, is employed only in 
conjunction with the state-level incumbency variable, we define it with reference to these 
19 states.  We use three alternative definitions for this variable.  Under the first definition, 
we define EconPerf as a continuous variable setting it equal to the average growth rate in 
the state from 2004-05 to 2008-09 minus the average national growth rate over the same 
period.  In this case, the variable takes a positive value for states with growth rates above 
the national average and negative for states below the national average.  A positive value 
of coefficient δs implies that candidates of the state-level incumbent party contesting 
within the constituencies in that state are rewarded or punished relative to the candidates 
of non-incumbents as the state grows faster or slower than the national average.   
Under the second definition, we divide the states into two groups: those 
experiencing above median growth and those experiencing below median growth.  The 
broken line in Figure 3 shows the division.  In this case, EconPerf takes the form of a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for states with above-median growth and 0 for 
those with below-median growth.   
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Finally, we arrange the states according to declining average rates of growth and 
the divide them into three equal-size groups with high, medium and low average growth 
rates.   The dotted lines in Figure 3 demarcate these groups.  Under this third definition, 
we set EconPerf equal to 1 for states in the highest-growth group and 0 for the lowest 
growth group with he middle states dropped from the sample.  The expected sign of δs in 
this case is positive.  Under a variation of this definition, we set the variable equal to 1 for 
the lowest-growth group of states and zero for the rest of them.  In this case, expected 
sign of δs is negative.14 
Figure 3 Difference between the Average Growth Rate of State Domestic Product 
and the GDP Growth Rate (2004-2008) 
 























 This completes the description of our empirical model and we can now describe 
our results. Our first set of regressions is shown in Table 11.  We include top four 
                                                 
14 As noted in the appendix, we also drop Karnataka as determining incumbency was difficult. 
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candidates in the regressions (thus, the unconditional probability of each candidate being 
elected is .25).  In column I we estimate the model with only candidate characteristics 
included among the explanatory variables. Consistent with the unconditional probabilities 
in Section 5, education and wealth are consistently positively associated with the 
probability of victory.   
 In columns II, we introduce dummy variable for incumbency at the level of the 
candidate and in column III, we add a similar variable for the central ruling party.  The 
latter takes a value of 1 if the candidate comes from one of the parties in the UPA and 
zero otherwise.  In Column IV we include dummy variables representing other major 
party groups that contested the elections together such as the NDA, the Third Front, and 
the Fourth Front. The excluded category here consists of parties that were not a part of 
any of the above groups.   
In column IV, we also include a dummy variable representing membership in the 
ruling party (two ruling parties if they share power in the state legislative party) in the 
state in which the constituency is located.  We define the ruling party as the party (or 
parties if power is shared) in power in 2007 and two or three preceding years.  As 
previously noted, if a legislative assembly election takes place in 2008 or 2009 and the 
party is in power loses, it still treated as the incumbent. The underlying logic is that the 
electorate would hold the party ran the government for several years responsible for the 
policies and performance of the state rather than the incoming party, which barely gets 
the chance to prove or disprove itself.  In column V of Table 11, we add the state-fixed 
effects to the variables included in column IV as a check on the robustness of the results. 
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 Three main results can be gleaned from Table 11.  First, candidate-level 
incumbency makes statistically highly significant contribution to victory.  Ceteris 
paribus, regardless of their party affiliation, sitting members of Lok Sabha have higher 
probability of victory than the other candidates.  Consistent with the unconditional 
probabilities we observed earlier, the results in column II and III suggest a numerically 
large positive effect of incumbency at the candidate level.  Without any party 
membership controls (column II), a sitting member of Lok Sabha is 22 percent more 
likely to win the election than someone who is not a member but has similar 
characteristics in terms of wealth, gender, education and criminal record.  The advantage 
declines to only 18 percent if we control for membership in the UPA (column III).  But 
the advantage declines dramatically to just 7 percent after we control for membership in 
other party groupings and in the incumbent party in state (column IV). 
The second result to follow from Table 11 concerns the role of party incumbency 
at the center.  Consistent with the general impression, ceteris paribus, membership in the 
UPA gave candidates greater advantage than membership in any other party grouping.  
Compared with candidates without membership in any major party groupings, 
memberships in the UPA, NDA, Third Front and Fourth Front raise the probability of 
victory by 53, 31, 15 and 36 percent, respectively.  That is to say, ceteris paribus, the 
UPA candidates had an edge over all other candidates. 
Finally, incumbency at the sate level plays an important role.  Ceteris paribus, a 
candidate belonging to the state incumbent party had 30 percent higher chance of being 
elected than the candidates of other parties.  Interestingly, the addition of state-fixed 
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effects (column V) has virtually no effect on the results either in terms of statistical 
significance or numerical values of the coefficients. 
Our base specification used in the analysis in the rest of the paper is given by the 
specification in Column V in which we include state fixed effects and different dummies 
for party groupings.  But to sharp focus, we suppress the coefficients of these variables. 
In Table 12, we introduce the key variable of interest: interaction between state-level 
incumbency and economic performance.  In column I, we use the variable EconPerf in its 
continuous form and set it equal to the average growth in the state minus the national 
average growth rate during 2004-2008.  For states with average growth rate below the 
national average, this performance variable takes a negative value.  The estimated 
coefficient is 0.07, which says that the candidate of a state incumbent party has a 7 
percent higher probability of victory than the candidates of non-incumbent parties if the 
average growth rate in that state exceeds the national average by 1 percent.  If the growth 
advantage is 2 percent, the probability is 14 percent higher.  On the other hand, if the 
growth rate in the state is below the national average, candidates of incumbent parties are 
punished. 
In column II of Table 12, we include the interaction between candidate level 
incumbency and economic performance; and between central level ruling party and 
economic performance. The coefficients are insignificant. It implies that the incumbency 
at candidate or central party level is not necessarily rewarded more in better performing 
states.  In Column III we calculate the growth differential over a shorter and more recent 
period 2006-07 to 2008-09 to calculate the growth differential variable. In column IV of 
table 11, we define EconPerf as a dummy variable, calling it “Dummy for high growth 
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states.”  As explained above, it takes a value of 1 for candidates of incumbent parties in 
states with above-median growth and zero otherwise.  We now obtain a much larger 
value of 0.45 for δs.  The candidates of incumbent parties in above median growth on 
average have an advantage of 45 percent over those of non-incumbents.  This large effect 
also substantially cuts the effect of state-level incumbency in general (from 0.32 to 0.14).  
 In column IV, we go a step further to sharpen the contribution of growth to the 
election of the candidates of the state-level incumbent party.  We now define the 
EconPerf variable as “Dummy for high growth states 2,” which takes a value of 1 for the 
states in the group with top third rates of growth and 0 for the states in the lowest growth 
group with the states in the middle groups dropped from the sample.  We now get the 
effect of growth in high-growth group relative to the low-growth group.  Predictably, the 
value of the coefficient δs now increases to 0.65. 
 In Column V, we explicitly test for the punishment effect by defining the 
EconPerf variable in terms of low growth states, by defining the variable as a dummy that 
takes a value of 1 for states with below-median growth and zero otherwise.  The 
estimated coefficient is –0.20.  In column 2, we sharpen this effect by setting the dummy 
equal to 1 for the lowest-growth group and 0 for the highest-growth group and dropping 
the states in the middle-growth group from the sample.  The coefficient now turns out to 
be negative and larger in magnitude: -0.24.   
Without explicitly reporting the results, we note that we also performed a 
robustness check with respect to the definition of the incumbent party at the state level.  
In states where elections took place in 2006-07 or 2007-08 and the ruling party lost, we 
replace the incumbent by that outgoing party.  The modification leads to changes in five 
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states: Kerala, Uttarkhand, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.  The results in 
columns V and VI of Table 12 move very little.  This suggests that the results we obtain 
are not dominated by one or two specific states and are therefore not sensitive to a small 
number of switches in the states on the margin. 
7. Concluding Remarks  
 This paper provides the first analysis of the relationship of growth to election 
outcomes in India.  It also provides the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of the 
2009 Lok Sabha elections.  We assembled a comprehensive data set consisting of all 
candidates contesting the election.  Our results are robust to virtually every modification 
that seemed intuitively plausible to us. 
 Our main results may be summarized as follows.  First, personal characteristics 
such as education and wealth have at most a small impact on election outcomes even 
though this is not apparent from the unconditional within group probabilities discussed in 
Section 5.  Second, at least in the 2009 election incumbency at all levels—candidate, 
national ruling party and state ruling party—contributed positively to election prospects 
of a candidate.  Here we use “incumbency” in the ex post sense and it does not control for 
differences that may arise from unobservable characteristics.  Finally, our key result is 
that superior growth performance at the level of the state gives a definite advantage to the 
candidates of the incumbent party in the constituencies of that state. 
 We conclude with a word of caution with respect to our last result.  Growth itself 
may be correlated with several attributes that the voters value.  For example, superior 
growth performance may be positively correlated with good governance including law 
and order.  It may also be associated with reduced levels of poverty.  Therefore, there 
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remains scope for differences of opinion on whether the voters rewarded growth in the 
2009 elections or other variables with which it might be correlated.  From the policy 
perspective, we do not see this as a major issue, however.  Even if it is these other 
variables that voters value over growth per se, growth would serve as a reasonable target 
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Table 11: Probability of Victory and Incumbency at the Candidate and National 
Party Level 
 
 I II III IV V
Age 0.00* 0 0 0 0
 [1.92] [0.76] [0.23] [-0.15] [-0.44]
Gender (female) 0.09** 0.08* 0.06 0.04 0.04
 [2.14] [1.89] [1.53] [1.18] [1.06]
Education Index 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02*
 [3.00] [2.70] [2.35] [1.96] [1.74]
Wealth Index 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03***
 [7.44] [6.31] [4.53] [2.70] [3.27]
Criminal Index 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
 [0.56] [0.63] [1.14] [1.35] [1.38]
Incumbent 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.07***
 [6.99] [5.81] [2.60] [2.60]
UPA 0.26*** 0.53*** 0.53***
 [9.55] [9.18] [8.95]
NDA 0.31*** 0.32***
 [4.70] [4.74]
Third front 0.15** 0.14**
 [2.35] [2.18]
Fourth front 0.36*** 0.38***
 [4.11] [4.20]
Incumbent Party in State Assembly 0.30*** 0.31***
 [9.29] [9.36]
  
Observations 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750
 
Note that *, ** and *** indicate a statistically significant coefficient with probability 
0.90, 0.95 and 0.99, respectively. 
 
 34
Table 12: Probability of Victory and State-Level Growth-Incumbency Interaction 
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI VII
Age 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 [-0.34] [-0.38] [-0.49] [-0.28] [-1.13] [-0.28] [-1.13]
Gender (female) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.11** 0.04 0.11**
 [1.24] [1.26] [1.26] [1.08] [2.21] [1.08] [2.21]
Education Index 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02 0.02* 0.02
 [1.97] [2.00] [1.90] [1.88] [1.22] [1.88] [1.22]
Wealth Index 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03**
 [2.99] [2.97] [2.99] [3.04] [2.39] [3.04] [2.39]
Criminal Index 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
 [1.42] [1.40] [1.35] [1.20] [0.30] [1.20] [0.30]
Incumbent 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.10***
 [3.08] [2.91] [2.97] [2.65] [2.69] [2.65] [2.69]
Incumbent Party in State Assembly 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.58*** 0.78***
 [9.30] [9.24] [7.66] [3.87] [3.66] [12.44] [19.39]
Growth difference (2004-08) x 
UPA 
-0.01  
 [-0.58]  
Growth difference (2004-08) x 
Incumbent 
-0.01  
 [-0.70]  
Growth difference (2004-08) x 
State Incumbency 
0.07*** 0.06***  
 [6.03] [5.27]  
Growth difference (2006-08) x 
State Incumbency 
0.04***  
 [4.8]  
Dummy for High state x 
State Incumbency 
0.45***  
 [6.6]  












Observations 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,727 1,139 1,727 1,139
Note that *, ** and *** indicate a statistically significant coefficient with probability 
0.90, 0.95 and 0.99, respectively. 
